Political Economy of Broadcast License in Nigeria

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Abstract

The political economy literature is replete with the arguments about the effects of public and private ownership of the media on political and public policy outcomes. The literature equally hints at some theoretical and empirical attempts at explaining and describing the distortions present in the public sphere for news and other media contents owing to political, ideological, economic and market forces. Apparently, broadcasting is very important in Nigeria because a majority of Nigerians get their information, education and entertainment chiefly from radio and television. Because of this vital role of information, education and entertainment of broadcasting in developing countries, radio and television mediums have become the most controlled for both technical and political reasons. Thus, broadcast license is an invaluable asset to a station owner. This is understandable as a station owner can neither be allocated any frequency nor be able to operate without a license. To react to these posers, this research is multidisciplinary. It employs socio and legal research methods t oobtain the contextual datatoundertake a critical examination of the provisions of the National Broadcasting Commission Act No 38 of 1992 as amended and finds certain inherent defects in the enabling law for the regulation of broadcasting in the country. With the tenets of Political Economy Theory and Systems Theory in mind, this study found that the decision of government to empower the regulator to revoke license which it cannot grant is no doubt part of the political economy and part of the general trend by which public officials particularly in the developing world are empowered to appropriate all powers to state authorities. Therefore, broadcast media should be free from monopoliesof existence, as well as governmental, political, economic or material and license control, which are essential for dissemination of information for development.

***Key words**: Broadcast, licensing, enabling law, Nigeria, political economy and systems theory*

Introduction

The political economy literature is replete with the arguments about the effects of public and private ownership of the news media on political and public policy outcomes. The reviewed literature equally hints at some theoretical and empirical attempts at explaining and describing the distortions present in the public sphere for news and other media contents owing to political, ideological, economic and market forces (Popoola, 2019). Empirical evidence by Murdock and Golden (2016) points that it is common to be confronted with the arguments that the media and public communication apparatuses function essentially in tune with certain ideological, economic and market driven variables, thus, pointing to the paradigm that the news media in today's world, especially in democracies, indisputably operate in the area of political economy.

Political economy can be understood as a collective term for theories and approaches that stress the necessity of analysing the interrelations between economic processes and specific political circumstances (Schubert &Klein, 2011). This concern, which might sound banal, is given a more meaningful twist when there is a look at the development of the interpretations that have been nurtured by it. Although the term had been coined earlier within the framework of eighteenth-century European moral philosophy, a critical assessment of the 'political economy' of the nineteenth-century Europe is closely connected with the German philosopher Karl Marx (Wasko, 2014). Marx reviewed the intertwining of the state with economic modes of production in capitalist system both in general terms and against the background of his universal visions. In his view, capitalism as economy and system of social organisation was only ever made possible with the help of the modern state and its legal structures.

Herman and Chomsky (2002) deconstruct the myth of the pluralist and free media in democracies by showing how the dominance of profit orientation in the media and their close connection to the advertising industry create pressure for information to be filtered,

thus narrowing the scope of the media to cover only what which is deemed favourable to capitalist social structure.Taking the political economy and broadcast license side-by-side, this papersets to examine the political economy of Nigeria broadcast license.

Justification, Objective and Methodology

The political and economic framework of any society determines the media operations in such a society. This is because it is difficult to separate the two. According to Udoakah (2017), the world has been divided into three political and economic systems namely: the capitalist, communist and the developing countries media system. One aspect of this division is that ownership of radio and television stations is concentrated in the hands of the few who own private properties as well as control the government. Onoja (2005) affirmed that those who own properties such as radio and television stations may also have political and economic interests. In many cases, news reportage and presentation may be skewed to protect such interests. Hence, the stations will normally protect such owner's capital. Scholars like Nyman-Metcalf (2003) and Iwokwagh (2005) also persuasively pointed to the adverse impact of government influence and control of the media.Not many seem to realize that the said control is hardly done illegally as the enabling laws often allowed for such powers of control, one of which is the licensing of the broadcast media.Given the reality that Nigeria is a capitalist society where public communication systems are both public and privately owned and are perceived to be dedicated to generating maximum returns (both intrinsically and extrinsically) to shareholders, political economy of the broadcastmedia is consequently evident in the country and thus is worth being explored and put into inspiring perspectives. Consequently, this paper seeks to isolate and illuminate on the political economy of broadcast license in Nigeria.

This paper employs a multidisciplinary research methodology using a combination of socio and legal methods to obtain the contextual data. The paper identified and examined, in a doctrinal sense, the

primary source of law which, in this case, is the National Broadcasting Commission Act No. 38 of 1992 along with amendments made to it since its enactment. A comparative study of broadcast regulatory laws in other jurisdictions was also undertaken to throw light on global realities on the subject. Apparently, selected pertinent judicial decisions in Law Reports and Journals were reviewed to examine the political economy of broadcast licensing in Nigeria. The paper also critically examined non-legal sources for investigative or supporting information. Among the technical documents reviewed were: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; The National Broadcasting Commission Act No. 38 of 1992 and all its amendments; Law Reports from "selected cases of the National Broadcasting Commission (2014); The Nigeria Broadcasting Code (2012); and Enabling laws, statutes and instruments related to broadcast licensing of Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa, the United States and Britain.

Theoretical Underpinning

The main concern of this paper is political economy of broadcast license in Nigeria where the thrust of this piece is anchored in the Political Economy Theory and Systems Theory. Historically, political economy originally referred to a tradition of economic thinking that addressed the production, distribution and consumption of resources used to sustain human existence.The prominent eighteenth century, Scottish thinker, Adams Smith referred to political economy as the study of wealth and the study of how mankind arranges to allocate scarce resources with a view to satisfying certain needs and not others.

Mosco (1996) articulated that the term political economy would seem to indicate a shared concern with the politics and economics of any given institution including the mass media. From conceptual point of view, 'political economy is the science of wealth and deals with efforts made by man to supply wants and satisfy desires.'It is important to stress that before political economy became a science,

it served as the intellectual description for a system of production, distribution and exchange; 'political' meant the social custom, practice and knowledge about how to manage, first the household and later, the community. Specifically, the term 'economics' has its roots in the classical Greek 'oikos' for household and 'nomos' for laws. Hence, economics initially referred to household management, a view that persisted into the work of founding influences in classical political economy, Scottish Enlightenment figures like Francis Hutcheson and, crucially, Adam Smith. Mosco (1996) sees political economy as 'the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources'. From this perspectivethe products of communication, such as broadcast, constitute the primary resources.

This theory studies elite control of economic institutions, such as banks and stock markets and, triesto show how this control affects many other social institutions, including the mass media (Baran & Davis, 2012). Political economists accept the classical Marxist assumption that the base dominates the superstructure. They investigate the means of production by looking at economic institutions, expecting to find that these institutions shape the media to suit their interests and purposes. For example, Herb Schiller, 'one of the most widely, recognized and influential political economists of communication'. Schiller (2000) is of the view that political economists have examined how economic constraint limit or bias the forms of mass culture produced and distributed through the media. These theorists focus on how the process of content production and distribution are constrained. Why do some forms of culture or activity dominate prime-time television schedules whereas other forms are absent? Does audience taste alone explain these differences or can other, less obvious reasons be linked to the interests of economic institutions?

Political economy can be understood as a collective term for theories and approaches that stress the necessity of analysing the interrelations between economic processes and specific political

circumstances. This concern, which might sound banal, is given a more meaningful twist when we look at the development of the interpretations that have been nurtured by it. Although the term had been coined earlier within the framework of eighteenth-century European moral philosophy, a critical assessment of the 'political economy' of nineteenth-century Europe, is closely connected with the German philosopher Karl Marx. Marx reviewed the intertwining of the state with economic modes of production in capitalist systems both in general terms and against the background of his universal visions. In his view, capitalism as economy and system of social organisation was only ever made possible with the help of the modern state and its legal structures.

One of the compound concepts that have found a permanent stay in the discipline of mass communication for many decades now is political economy. This word is from two distinct social science disciplines, political science and economics, with historical explanations and theoretical viewpoints available to explain the relevance and applications. Schiller (2000, p. 101) sees political economy of the media as "involving the idea of media ownership, the media market and financial support". McQuail (2005) sees it differently when he affirmed that mass communication can be considered as both a 'societal' and a 'cultural' phenomenon. The mass media institution is part of the structure of society and its technological infrastructure is part of the economic and power base, while the ideas, images and information disseminated by the media are evidently on important aspect of our culture.

Apparently, Systems Theory described the society as a system with the mass media, asubsystem. In this interplay the vibrations of the system preserve the subsystems and the output of the subsystems in turn perpetuates the system. This scenario sometimes appears a bit too abstract to fathom. Mele, Pels and Polese (2010) describe the systems theory as an interdisciplinary theory about every system in nature, in society and in many scientific domains as well as a framework with which one can investigate phenomena from a holistic approach (Okon, 2019).

The focus oftentimes is on the interactions and on the relationships between parts in order to understand an entity's organisational functioning and outcomes. Mele, Pels and Polese (2010) see Systems Theory as a dialogue between holism and reductionism. Friedman and Allen (2010) elucidate that the Systems Theory draws its roots from the pioneering works done by Bertalanffy and Bronfenbrenner in 1968. According to them, the theory sees a system as a whole, with its relationship and interactions with other systems as a mechanism of growth and change.

Ansari (2004) sees the Systems Theory as focusing on the arrangement of and relations between the parts and how they work together as a whole. The point to note is that the way the parts are organised and how they interact with each other determine the properties of the elements. In application, therefore, this theory can be used to analyse relationships between organisations and their environment. Organisations in this context may very well capture the press while the political economy may also be used to explain environmental dynamics. The point of discourse, however, is the push and pulls vibrations the system exerts on the subsystem and how the subsystem rebounds with input or output that served to sustain the system. Thebeauty of these theories interestingly lies on its multi-disciplinary applications. Considering the interplay of the political economy of the broadcast license and the operation of the broadcast media within the social system, the Political Economy and Systems Theory which the paper is anchored in appears apt.

Historical Antecedent of Broadcasting in Nigeria

Broadcasting was introduced to Nigeria in 1932 by the British. Since then – that is, well over eight decades – the subject has had a fluctuating status. It began as a Federal matter with the colonial masters running a radio service in Lagos as a branch of the "Empire Service" established in all British colonies. None of the regions had any broadcast station at the time. By virtue of the Lyttleton

Constitution of 1954 which gave autonomy to the regions on a number of subjects including broadcasting, it became possible for a region to own a broadcast station; hence, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the then Premier of the Western Region established the Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service in Ibadan in 1959. From 1976 to 1979, broadcasting reverted to a Federal matter under a centralized military government. This was altered again in 1979 when the new constitution of that year moved broadcasting from the exclusive to the concurrent legislative list (Iredia, 2017).

This made it easy for State governments to set up their own radio and television stations. Although the development increased the number of stations and broke the federal monopoly on the subject, ownership of broadcast stations remained essentially governmental albeit at different levels as individual participation was excluded. During the Second Republic, it became obvious that the Federal government was still in a position to dominate the sector. This followed an incident in which the Ogun State government-owned television, (OGTV) controlled by a political party different from the Federal ruling party, was jammed by the federally-owned transmitter thereby depriving the citizens from enjoying the popular local content of the state station. This showed that an independent regulatory body needed to come on board to impartially regulate broadcasting.

Nothing happened until 1992 when the situation was liberalized during the administration of military President Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) with the enactment of Decree No. 38 of 1992 to among other things empower private individuals to also own broadcast stations. The same Decree also saw the need to establish a regulatory authority known as the National Broadcasting Commission to organize the process of broadcast licensing as well as to monitor and direct all matters pertaining to broadcasting in Nigeria. Section 2 of the Act spelt out a long list of functions for the Commission with only licensing being the main concern of this paper (Iredia, 2017).

According to the said Decree 38 of 1992 which is now an Act of the National Assembly, it became the duty of the National Broadcasting Commission (hereafter simply referred to as the commission) to confirm that an applicant seeking a broadcast license was qualified to be granted one. The advertised method of application for a license to own, establish or operate a radio, sound, television, cable or satellite was for any interested party to send an application through a prescribed form addressed to the Director-General of the Commission. The Commission was expected to base its findings on verifiable evidence that the applicant:

a. Is a body corporate registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act or a station owned, established or operated by the Federal, State or Local government;
b. Can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that he is not applying on behalf of any foreign interest;
c. Can comply with the objectives of the National Mass Communication Policy as is applicable to the electronic media, that is, radio and television;
d. Can give an undertaking that the licensed station shall be used to promote national interest, unity and cohesion and that it shall not be used to offend the religious sensibilities or promote ethnicity, sectionalism, hatred and disaffection among the peoples of Nigeria.

Therefore, it is apparent to expect that anyone who met the above-named terms would not be unreasonably disallowed from obtaining a broadcast license owing to the fact that such an applicant was neither a religious body nor a political part which were *ab initio*disqualified by Section 10 of the Act. Corroborating, Iredia (2017) remarks that, no applicant was to be allowed "to have controlling shares in more than two of each of the broadcast sectors of transmission". The regulatory authority was to actualize the intention of the Act to liberalize the process by ensuring that it distributes stations of successful applicants between urban, rural, commercial or other categorization.It was also apparent by law to

regulate the structure of the shareholding in every station vis-a-vis the number of shareholding of the same applicant in other stations.

In this perspective, the Commission was empowered to allocate frequencies to licensed stations; just as the location of a station, its call up sign, a unique series of letters and or numbers dedicated to the identification of a station, was to be approved by the Commission. The scope of coverage to be served by each station was also made subject to the approval of the Commission. Paraphrasing the words of Iredia (2017), the latter was also empowered to regulate the technical specifications of equipment and standard of transmission; impose sanctions on breaches and prescribe an appropriate fee payable. Operatives of the Commission were free to enter into the premises of any station to inspect or examine any apparatus of operation in the station in order to ascertain their conformity with approved specification.

Literature Review

A broadcast license is an invaluable asset to a station owner. This is understandable as a station owner can neither be allocated any frequency nor be able to operate without a license. As paragraph 2.12.4 of the Nigeria Broadcasting Code (2012) clearly states, "no person shall operate a broadcast system which uses frequencies in the Federal Republic of Nigeria or operate any wireless equipment that uses broadcast frequencies unless authorised to do so through the assignment of a frequency or channel by the Commission." The power of the regulatory authority in Ghana, the National Communications Commission is similarly couched. According to Section 2(4) of the Electronic Communications Act, 2008, Act 775, "a person shall not operate a broadcasting system or provide a broadcasting service without a frequency authorisation by the Authority." Therefore, any person or entity in Ghana seeking to operate a system for the provision of broadcasting services has to obtain an authorisation from the regulatory authority. Whether or not such a provision breaches the fundamental rights of those whose

requests for licenses are denied has been a subject of controversy for long. Freedom of expression as a human right can be described as universal considering the numerous similarly worded provisions on the subject across the globe (Iredia, 2017).

There is in earnest no substantial difference between the provisions of Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and that of Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well as that of Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights. They all clearly stipulate that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of frontiers.

If so, it would appear that these provisions are undermined by the practice whereby broadcasters are constrained in exercising the right in view of the principle of licensing in which a person may be unable to obtain a license to operate a broadcast station. For many years, the justification for licensing was based on the argument that because broadcasting uses spectrum which is a scarce public resource, it is virtually impossible to grant every request for a license without creating a chaotic broadcasting milieu. There is doubt if this argument is valid today as a result of the rise of what Thierer (2016) describes as countless unlicensed new competitors and technologies, including: cable and satellite television; satellite radio; VCRs and DVDs; the Internet and the World Wide Web; blogging; social networking; podcasting; portable digital music and video; gaming platforms and many other multimedia information and entertainment services. Earlier, a staff researcher at the Federal Communications Commission in the United States had similarly reasoned that "the "Scarcity Rationale" merely made the freedom which traditional broadcasters can enjoy from First Amendment rights less than those of providers of newspapers, books and magazines, movies, live performances and cable and satellite broadcasters" (Berresford, 2005, p. 7).

This rather persuasive argument notwithstanding, Salomon (2008) confirms that the old order of regulating broadcasting across the globe subsists on a three-sided power made up of:

a) The administration of the broadcasting sector through the award and issuance of broadcasting licenses;
b) The general supervision and monitoring of stations; and
c) The determination of the guidelines in the form of code of practice.

The regulatory agency or body by whatever nomenclature it is known usually has the power to grant licenses to applicants. In the United States, it is called the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). It is called Office of Communication in the United Kingdom and known as the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority in Tanzania. They all have enormous powers to regulate all broadcast stations in their different jurisdictions. In South Africa, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) is empowered to issue broadcast licenses; ensure service and access; monitor the industry and deal with disputes; as well as control and manage the frequency spectrum and protect consumers from unfair business practices. All regulators are however not equally empowered; many are fully authorized to make the awards while others such as the regulator in Nigeria can only make recommendations to the government on the subject. But they all seem to have the power to revoke a license which means that they ought to be composed of impartial members, otherwise government officials may use the regulatory bodies against political opponents and adversaries (Iredia, 2017).

It might be difficult to avert such a situation going by the allegation by Nyman-Metcalf (2003, p. 25) that in many African countries, there is a lack of transparency of the regulators, which makes it very difficult to understand on what basis or why decisions are taken. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO) may have had this in mind when in its proposed guidelines on licensing, it drew attention to two issues; the first is the need to ensure that licensing procedures are empirical and transparent while the second is the expedience of selecting only members of regulatory authorities that "can function free from any interference or pressure from political or economic forces." This is achievable if, among other things, the duties and responsibilities of an independent regulatory authority are set out in law, with its decisions subject to judicial review. As Salomon (2008) has argued, an independent regulator is likely to bring forth independent broadcast stations which are particularly important in democracies, where the availability of an independent media is vital for a functioning, informed electorate. Perhaps because government is formed by a particular political party, many people may not have faith in government appointed regulators but how the UK, Germany and South Africa have handled theirs appears worthy of emulation.

In the UK, the practice is for vacancies on regulatory bodies to be advertised for anybody to apply while selection is organized by an independent public appointments agency. In Germany, some notable interest groups such as trade unions, religious and professional bodies have the right to nominate candidates. In South Africa, the law requires the members of its Independent Communications Authority to have suitable qualifications, expertise and experience in certain fields among them broadcasting, telecommunications, journalism, engineering, etc. In other parts of Africa, the licensing process is rather suspected. Ayedun-Aluma (2017, p. 2) specifically alleges that "the processing of licensing does not promote the transparency of media ownership." The framework for broadcast licensing in Nigeria needs to change from its present colouration of members of the regulatory body who by virtue of their political appointment and lack of independence from government cannot but be partisan. Perhaps this explains the suggestion by Nyman-Metcalf (2003) that newregulations should focus on increased transparency and accessibility of the activities of regulatory bodies. This, according to the scholar, must be properly organized so that the issue of licensing is sufficiently de-mystified for the public to clearly understand why someone gets a frequency while another person is denied.

Therefore, going by the preceding observation, it would be difficult to control the stations as whatever the regulator does to any operator would be criticised against what she does to a government broadcast stationexcept this kind of position is adopted in Nigeria. Similarly, there is little the Commission can do to stations run by government and big time commercial elites. It is on record that in 2012, a former Director-General of the Commission, Yomi Bolarinwa admitted when he voiced his frustrations in dealing with recalcitrants. He maintains that, "public stations that were operating largely as the mouth piece of government instead of representing the whole society while the private stations operate as the mouth piece of the rich and powerful with the common man abandoned by both".

Interrogating Political Economy of Broadcast License in Nigeria

On the one hand, political economy (PEM) of the broadcast media is interested in the course of the production, distribution as well as competition. The production has to do with whether the broadcast media is producing at a loss or gain and that is why it is called political economy. The distribution has to do with the amount thatinvolves in the circulation of the broadcast content while competition has to do with the marketization process. Popoola (2018) supports this by saying that a good deal of PEM research has focused on the evolution of mass communications or media as commodities that are produced and distributed by profit-seeking organisations in capitalist industries or, in other words, media as business. The trends that Murdock and Golding identified in 1974 have expanded and intensified, not only within traditional media industries but also across industrial division into newly converged businesses. Therefore, the political and economic framework of any society determines the media operations in such a society. Thus, Nigerian example has shown how the ownership structure of the media determines the political landscape of the country before the deregulation of the media happened just before the dawn of the

millennium. Based on this, it may suffice to draw the media at the centre of three forces as demonstrated by McQuail (2010) below:



Source :(McQuail, 2010).

On the other hand, the major statutory function of the NBC is the operation of a broadcast media in Nigeria. According to the NBC (2012) the procedure for a broadcast license starts with purchase, processing and consideration of applications for the ownership of radio and television stations including cable television services, direct satellite broadcast and any other medium of broadcasting. Applicants must have a limited liability company with the Nigeria's Corporate Affairs Commission, (CAC). The application fee is ₦50, 000 naira, non-refundable. The processing entails viability and economic status of a given area. There were three categories of applications, A, B and C for urban, semi urban or rural areas spectrum or frequency allocation and its cost. Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt as commercial centres and capital cities fall under category A. The cost of license fee is between ₦15 and ₦20 million naira for radio and television. Akure, Ibadan, Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Maiduguri were under category B, while all the remaining cities like Owerri, Dutse, Damaturu, Ikot Ekpene attract less license fee of ₦10 million naira. For Ikot Ekpene, Eruwa and Shagari village the licensing fee is below ₦10 million naira.

Despite the categorisation of licensing fees, the Freedom House Report (2015) suggested that the broadcast media are complaining over the high fees in line with the economic realities in the country. The report emphasised:

> Licensing fees and taxes for broadcast media remain high and many outlets experience financial difficulties, limiting their viability. The only two nationwide broadcast networks are state-owned: The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria and the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA). However, in 2010 the NBC awarded the first private radio and television network license to Silverbird Communications, which had outbid two other private competitors for the licenses (p. 10).

Other requirements for a broadcast license include the editorial and programmes of radio and television stations, its philosophy and personnel scrutinised by broadcast experts from the NBC. The promoters must swear under oath that the broadcast station if granted license will promote national unity and cohesion. Similarly, the proposed broadcast station must state its engineering capacity such as type of mast, tower or guarded, transmitter type, antenna and Video Tape Recorders (VTR) for TV and audio equipment for radio. These facilities will be inspected by the NBC engineers.

The application form clearly states that only Nigerians by birth and nationalism can own or promote terrestrial stations while foreigners can provide services for cable broadcast operations. The financial capacity of the promoter(s) is equally evaluated through bank reference by the commission. These are strict conditions for processing and eventual granting of broadcast licenses. Once the application is verified and certified by NBC officials, a recommendation is sent to the President by the Director-General through the Minister of Information for approval. A broadcast license is renewable after five years. Only the President, Commander in Chief, has the sole power to grant the license according to the Constitution. Nwanze (2003, p. 250) argued that the provision of this law subjects the licensing procedure to political manipulations and considerations especially under the democratic rule. The broadcast license can be revoked by the NBC, if the

broadcast stations breach the rules and regulations specified in the Nigeria Broadcasting Code.

Right from the inception, the National Broadcasting Commission, NBC, was established and empowered by the Decree No. 38 of 1992 as amended by the NBC (Amendment) Decree No. 55 of 1999 with the mission to evolve defined standards, in all aspects of broadcasting, to effectively license, monitor and regulate an environment that encourages investment and development of quality programming and technology for a viable industry, which competes favorably in the Global Information Society.NBC however seems to be very weak in arresting the broadcasting situation in the country upon all the power given to it by the law.

Going by the proceeding evidence in the literature, it is clear that the political economy of the broadcast license in Nigeria is apparent. The media have become a commercial product and this undermines the responsibility of the media to the watchdog role of the society in terms of checking the activities and holding government of the day accountable to the people. Arguably, there is a close relationship between political system and media system for both to survive. However, what the media is producing is substandard to the political economy. In an ideal situation, the establishment of the media is factored into the political development of the society. Thus, taking the media and political economy side-by-side, it is apparent that the media are doing less than what is expected. This is so because the media under capitalist or liberal system will compare the media to operate within the context of the system. As such, there is a political economy of media production, content production in the interface between social political systems.

Conclusion

It is safe to submit that Nigeria is characterised by great power of ownership, property and wealth. As such, it is apparent that one aspect of this division is that ownership of radio and television stations is concentrated in the hands of the few who own private

properties as well as control the government. This implies that those who own properties such as radio/television stations may also have political and economic interest. In many cases, news reportage and presentation maybe skewed to protect such interest. Hence, the stations will normally protect such owners' capital. It is obvious that the political economy of any nation lends coloration to the dynamics of the broadcast media. Therefore, this paperremarks that broadcast media should be free from monopoliesof existence, as well as of governmental, political, economic or material and licenses control, which are essential for dissemination of information for development. These arefundamental rights of every broadcast stations and not privileges. Thus, the media should produce content that will serve the interest of the social setting.

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